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NOTES
THE FIRST AMENDMENT BECOMES
A NUISANCE: ARCARA v.
CLOUD BOOKS, INC.
The sword of public nuisance is a blunt one, admirably designed to
curb noxious odors or to quell riots, but ill suited to the delicate
sphere of the First Amendment where legal overkill is fatal.*
Publication and dissemination of books are forms of expression protected
from governmental suppression by the first amendment.' Yet, it has also
been long recognized that such freedoms are not absolute,2 particularly
when state and local governments seek to exercise their police powers
through regulation to promote the public health, safety, and general wel-
fare.3 In the exercise of its police powers, the state has the authority to abate
public nuisances,' so long as it does not unduly infringe upon protected indi-
* Justice Mathew 0. Tobriner, California Supreme Court. People ex reL Busch v. Pro-
jection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 74, 550 P.2d 600, 620, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 348 (en banc)
(Tobriner, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 922 (1976).
1. See, e.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770 (1967); Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 150 (1959). In Smith, the Supreme Court emphasized that the dissemination of books
under "commercial auspices" does not lessen the constitutional protections traditionally af-
forded booksellers and publishers under the first amendment, because retail outlets play "a
most significant role in the process of the distribution of books." Id. at 150.
2. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575 (1983). Here, the Court noted that the federal government and the states "can subject
newspapers to generally applicable economic regulations without creating constitutional
problems." Id. at 581; see also Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139
(1969) (newspapers subject to antitrust laws); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 192-94 (1946) (newspapers subject to labor laws).
3. When state and local governments regulate land use, it is said that they are exercising
their "police powers." This has been defined as "the power of government to regulate human
conduct to protect or promote 'public health, safety or the general welfare.' " R. CUNNING-
HAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.2, at 517 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter R. CUNNINGHAM] (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395
(1926) (zoning ordinance forbidding erection of various business establishments in designated
residential districts within government's police power to promote the public health, safety, and
general welfare)).
4. A public nuisance has been defined as any activity that interferes with or "disrupt[s]
the comfort and convenience of the general public by affecting some general interest." Napro
Dev. Corp. v. Town of Berlin, 135 Vt. 353, 357, 376 A.2d 342, 346-47 (1977); see also Spur
Indus. Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 186, 494 P.2d 700, 708 (1972) (en banc)
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vidual freedoms.5 Upon judicial review of such regulatory measures, a bal-
ancing of interests must be undertaken, and a statute restricting first
amendment freedoms will be upheld only if it is based upon a compelling
state interest 6 and reaches a subject within the state's constitutional power to
regulate. 7
For example, illegal uses of land involving prostitution or gambling have
long been prohibited by state and local ordinances because they were deemed
public nuisances. 8 Thus, a state nuisance statute closing a massage parlor
for housing illicit sexual activities may hardly be said to raise first amend-
ment concerns, simply because no protected forms of expression are exer-
cised on the premises. 9 It becomes quite another matter, however, when the
site of illicit sexual activities is within an establishment associated with pro-
tected forms of expression, like a bookstore, and the state moves to enforce
these same nuisance powers against the owner of the premises.' Under
these circumstances, a state closure order would threaten the bookstore
owner's constitutionally protected right to disseminate books. 1 In Arcara v.
(developer entitled to enjoin commercial cattle feeding operation as a nuisance). See generally
Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997 (1966).
5. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (statute prohibiting solicita-
tion for any religious cause without first obtaining license from state official violated freedom
of religion). In what has become known in constitutional jurisprudence as the Overbreadth
Doctrine, see, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-24, at 710-12 (1978),
the Supreme Court has stated that "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnec-
essarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama,
377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964). See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
6. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (compelling state in-
terest alternatively described as one requiring a "paramount," "subordinating," or "substan-
tial" interest).
7. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963) (state may not, under the guise of
promoting a permissible end, ignore constitutional rights).
8. R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 3, at 417.
9. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (freedom of
speech cannot protect conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute, even if designed to
present a point of view).
10. See generally Comment, Can An Adult Theater or Bookstore Be Abated As a Public
Nuisance in California?, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 115, 125 (1975) ("The aim of a public nuisance
action is not the suppression of an idea, but rather the abatement of a condition which causes
injury to the public. Nevertheless, the granting of an injunction against a ... bookstore is, in
effect, suppression of the materials therein ....").
11. In People ex rel. Van De Kamp v. American Art Enter. Inc., 75 Cal. App. 3d 523,
529-30, 142 Cal. Rptr. 338, 341-42 (1977), the California Court of Appeals refused to close
down a building primarily used for publishing purposes, but which also served as a "nerve
center" for prostitution. Though the court issued an injunction under California's nuisance
statute to prevent any further illegal activity on the premises, it chose not to close down the
building itself because "an incidental infringement upon First Amendment rights [would be]
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Cloud Books, Inc., 2 the United States Supreme Court considered the likeli-
hood of such a threat to these first amendment freedoms when it reviewed
the constitutionality of a New York nuisance statute.
Arcara arose out of New York's effort to close an adult bookstore, oper-
ated by Cloud Books, under a nuisance statute authorizing a one-year clo-
sure of any building as a public nuisance if it was being used for prostitution
and lewdness.' 3 After local enforcement officials discovered acts of public
lewdness on the bookstore's premises, the state filed a civil action under the
statute seeking its closure." The Trial Division of the New York Supreme
Court, Special Term, denied Cloud Books' motion for partial summary judg-
ment,' 5 and the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed.' 6 Before
the New York Court of Appeals, however, Cloud Books won a reversal on
first amendment grounds.' 7 The court of appeals ruled that the one-year
closure order violated the first amendment because equally effective means
were available to the state to restrict illicit sexual activities without unduly
'greater than [that] essential to vindicate [the government's] ...interests.' " Id. at 531, 142
Cal. Rptr. at 342 (citation omitted).
12. 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1986).
13. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 119 Misc. 2d 505, 465 N.Y.S.2d 633, 635
(1983), aff'd, 101 A.D.2d 163, 475 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1984), modified, 65 N.Y.2d 324, 480 N.E.2d
1089, 491 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1986). Section 2320 of the New York
Public Health Law defines places of prostitution, lewdness, and assignation as public health
nuisances:
Whoever shall erect, establish, continue, maintain, use, own, or lease any building,
erection, or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution is
guilty of maintaining a nuisance. The building, erection, or place ...in or upon
which any lewdness, assignation, or prostitution is conducted, permitted, or carried
on, continued, or exists ... [is] hereby declared to be a nuisance and shall be enjoined
and abated as hereafter provided.
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2320 (McKinney 1985). Section 2329 provides for the closure of
any building found to be a public health nuisance under § 2320:
If the existence of the nuisance be admitted or established in an action as provided in
this article ... an order of abatement shall be entered as part of the judgment in the
case, which order ...shall direct the effectual closing of the building, erection or
place against its use for any purpose, and so keeping it closed for a period of one year
Id. § 2329.
14. People ex rel. Arcara, 119 Misc. 2d at 506, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 635. The deputy sheriff
working an undercover operation stated in his affidavit that he personally observed acts of
masturbation, fondling, and fellatio, while he himself had been solicited at least four times to
perform sexual acts in return for money. Id. at 506, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
15. Id. at 512, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
16. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 101 A.D.2d 163, 172, 475 N.Y.S.2d 173,
180 (1984), modified, 65 N.Y.2d 324, 480 N.E.2d 1089, 491 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1985), rev'd, 106 S.
Ct. 3172 (1986).
17. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 324, 337, 480 N.E.2d 1089,
1099, 491 N.Y.S.2d 307, 317 (1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1986).
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burdening the store owner's constitutionally protected bookselling
activities. "
In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court reversed.' 9 Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the majority, concluded that the New York Court of
Appeals erred in applying a first amendment standard of review to illicit
sexual conduct which manifested absolutely no element of protected expres-
sion.2" As a result, the Court refused to allow the first amendment to be
used as a shield behind which unlawful conduct could flourish.21 Justice
O'Connor, in a separate concurrence, agreed with the majority's judgment,
but emphasized that her decision would be entirely different if "a city were
to use a nuisance statute as a pretext for closing down a book store because it
sold indecent books."22 Dissenting, Justice Blackmun concluded that the
mandatory one-year closure placed a severe and unnecessary burden upon
the first amendment rights of booksellers.23 The dissent concluded that be-
cause state officials failed to show that they had chosen the least restrictive
means of pursuing their legitimate objectives, the mandatory closure require-
ment under the New York nuisance statute was unconstitutional as applied
18. Id. at 337, 480 N.E.2d at 1099, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
19. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 3172, 3178 (1986). On remand,
the New York Court of Appeals disagreed with the Court's first amendment analysis and
concluded that New York's actions did abridge Cloud Books' first amendment rights. See
infra note 164.
20. Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3177-78. In determining whether conduct is expressive or nonex-
pressive for purposes of first amendment protection, the Supreme Court has held that the
presence of a "communicative element" is crucial. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 117
(1972). That which is considered speech-related conduct, in which expression predominates,
will receive first amendment protection. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,
237-38 (1963) (peaceful demonstration on grounds of State House to protest state segregation
policies ruled constitutionally protected free speech). However, conduct in which "action"
dominates will not receive such protection. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,
336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (labor union activities designed to publicize their secondary boycott
"constituted a single and integrated course of conduct, which was in violation of ... [a valid
criminal statute]"). But see L. TRIBE, supra note 5, § 12-7, at 601:
The distinction between "expression" and "action" or "speech" and "conduct" is
essentially unhelpful because it asks a question which is answerable only if one has
already decided, on independent grounds, whether the act is protected by the first
amendment. The persistence of the distinction in the language of the Court may be
attributable to a reluctance to concede that the first amendment has any relevance
whatsoever to political assassinations, radical bank robberies, or other violent modes
of expression ....
Id. (footnotes omitted).
21. Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3177.
22. Id. at 3178 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor added that any attempt to
shut down an adult bookstore because of "the perceived secondary effects of having a purveyor
of such books in the neighborhood" would also constitute an improper use of a city's police
powers. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 3178-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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to Cloud Books.2 4
This Note will examine previous Supreme Court decisions that have eval-
uated the "operation and effect" of a state regulation upon first amendment
rights. It will also review the Court's attempt to fashion a coherent legal
standard which would apply to state regulations affecting conduct contain-
ing elements of speech and nonspeech, emphasizing specific state interests
which have been held sufficient by the Court to justify an infringement upon
protected first amendment expression. Further analysis will focus upon the
Court's decision in Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., highlighting the court's de-
bate over which circumstances properly trigger first amendment scrutiny of
a challenged statute. Finally, this Note will conclude that the Court's failure
to apply first amendment analysis in Arcara was a retreat from its previously
articulated willingness to examine the effects of indirect restrictions on first
amendment expression.
I. THE OPERATIONS AND EFFECTS TEST: WHAT A STATUTE SAYS
MAY NOT BE WHAT ITS APPLICATION MEANS
A nuisance statute, like any other state regulation, is a means by which
government seeks to achieve some legitimate end, generally to promote pub-
lic health and welfare, or to preserve the character of the community.25 In
the exercise of its police powers, however, the state may not substantially
impair first amendment freedoms.26 The state, therefore, must choose a stat-
utory means that is valid on its face and constitutional in its application.27
In general, a statute valid on its face, yet challenged as adversely affecting
first amendment rights, is analyzed under the constitutional principles out-
lined by the Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota.28 Under these principles,
a statute's purposes are scrutinized, as well as its "operation and effect".2 9
In Near, the Supreme Court struck down a Minnesota nuisance statute
which permitted the state to abate and enjoin any newspaper or other publi-
cation that published malicious, scandalous, or defamatory materials.3"
24. Id. at 3180 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25. See R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 3, at 516-18.
26. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 71-72 (1981) (discussed
infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 60 (1965)
(discussed infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text).
27. See L. TRIBE, supra note 5, § 12-2, at 580-84.
28. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
29. Id. at 708. For a review of early Supreme Court decisions establishing the operation
and effect analysis, see Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 244 (1911) ("[w]hat the State may not
do directly it may not do indirectly"); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 268
(1876) ("[i]n whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose must be determined by its
natural and reasonable effect").
30. 283 U.S. at 722-23. The statute at issue only permitted a defendant the defense that
1987]
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When Near's newspaper published several articles with strong anti-Semitic
overtones critical of local officials, 3' a Minnesota court issued a permanent
injunction forbidding further operation of his newspaper. 32 After reviewing
the purposes behind the statute,3 3 the Supreme Court ruled that its operation
and effect resulted in an unconstitutional prior restraint3 4 upon the press
which was tantamount to censorship.3 5 In the Court's view, proper redress
for false and malicious accusations made against one's person could be found
under libel laws, not in attempts to restrain the publication of newspapers
themselves.3 6
"truth was published with good motives and for justifiable ends." Id. at 702. The Court criti-
cized this aspect of the statute as granting the legislature too much power over the fate of
constitutionally protected freedoms of the press. Id. at 721. According to the court, "[i]f this
can be done, the legislature may provide machinery for determining in the complete exercise of
its discretion what are justifiable ends and restrain speech accordingly. And it would be but a
step to a complete system of censorship." Id.
31. Id. at 704. The articles charged in substance "that a Jewish gangster was in control of
gambling, bootlegging, and racketeering in Minneapolis, and that law enforcement officers and
agencies were not energetically performing their duties." Id. Specifically, charges were di-
rected at the Chief of Police for gross neglect of duty, illicit association with gangsters, and
accepting bribes. The County Attorney was accused of failing to take appropriate measures to
combat the known criminal activity, and the Mayor was accused of inefficiency and dereliction
of duty. Id.
32. Id. at 706.
33. Id. at 709-10. The stated purpose of the statute was to shut down newspapers or
periodicals that levelled "malicious" charges of corruption against public officials or made
defamatory statements against private citizens. Id. at 709. Such published materials were
declared "detrimental to public morals and to the general welfare." Id.
34. Id. at 713. The Court stated that the concept of prior restraint has its origins in the
English licensing system, abolished in 1695, under which nothing could be published without
prior approval of the church or state authorities. Id. at 713-14. In Near, the Court con-
demned such a practice, stating that "liberty of the press ... has meant, principally although
not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship." Id. at 716. In later deci-
sions, the Supreme Court has repeatedly regarded prior restraints upon the press as a serious
infringement upon first amendment freedoms. As the Court noted in Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963), "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." See Southeastern Pro-
motions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) ("a free society [such as ours] prefers to punish
the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle them and all others
beforehand" (emphasis in original)).
35. Near, 283 U.S. at 713. In the Court's view, "the operation and effect of the statute"
unnecessarily burdened newspapers' and periodicals' right to free expression prior to the com-
munication itself and therefore constituted a serious infringement upon their first amendment
freedoms. Id. The Court rejected Minnesota's contention that the statute was not aimed at
publications per se but with the "business" of publishing defamation, because "[c]haracterizing
the publication as a business, and the business as a nuisance, does not permit an invasion of the
constitutional immunity against restraint." Id. at 720.
36. Id. at 718-19. Cases such as Secretary of State of Maryland v. Munson Co., 467 U.S.
947, 964 n.12 (1984), underscore the fact that prior restraints or other restrictions on first
amendment rights may be present not only where a statute directly prohibits expression, as in
Near, but also where the impact of the statute indirectly curtails the excercise of these rights.
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An analogous application of Near's "operation and effect" analysis in the
area of obscenity law is exemplified by Freedman v. Maryland.3 7 Freedman
was convicted for exhibiting a motion picture18 without first submitting it to
the Maryland State Board of Censors for prior approval. 39 The statute,
which prohibited the distribution and exhibition of obscene movies, came
under careful scrutiny by the Supreme Court to determine if its application
had unduly burdened protected forms of expression.4 ° Relying upon its re-
cently developed definition of obscenity,4' the Supreme Court held that,
before movies could be banned, the issue of obscenity would have to be prop-
In Munson, the Supreme Court struck down a Maryland statute that prohibited charitable
organizations, "in connection with any fundraising activity, from paying or agreeing to pay as
expenses more than 25% of the amount raised." Id. at 950. This statute particularly hurt
charitable organizations whose solicitation costs were high because they disseminated informa-
tion that included viewpoints on public issues as part of their fundraising activities. Id. at 963.
Though the Maryland Secretary of State had authority to waive the 25% limitation, the Court
viewed this remedy as ineffective in safeguarding fundamental first amendment freedoms be-
cause "charities whose First Amendment rights are abridged by the fundraising limitation
simply would have traded a direct prohibition on their activity for a[n indirect] licensing
scheme that, if it is available to them at all, is available only at the unguided discretion of the
Secretary of State." Id. at 964 n.12.; see also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523
(1960) ("[first amendment] [flreedoms... are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal
attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference").
37. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
38. Id. at 60. The state conceded that Freedman's film "Revenge at Daybreak" did not
violate its statutory standards and would have received a license if it had been properly submit-
ted. Id.
39. Id. Under the statute that Freedman violated, the exhibitor of a film must submit his
film to the Maryland Board for approval, although no time limit was imposed for completion
of its action. Id. at 55. If the film was disapproved for showing, the exhibitor could pursue
several appeals, although nojudicial participation in review of such materials was mandated.
Id. The Supreme Court thereby concluded that "risk of delay was built into the Maryland
procedure." Id.
40. Id. at 57-60. In Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-55 (1959), the Court held that
a state may not impose absolute criminal liability on a bookseller for the mere possession of
obscene materials and stressed that the state's power to prevent its distribution did not mean
that there were no constitutional barriers to the practical exercise of that power. See supra
note 1 and accompanying text.
41. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957), the Court held that obscenity was
not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press. In Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 24 (1973), the Court enunciated the standard to determine obscenity. According to
Miller, to decide what materials are obscene, the trier of fact must consider:
whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest ... ;whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and ... whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. (citations omitted). See generally Schauer, Speech and "Speech"--Obscenity and "Obscen-
ity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979).
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erly adjudicated in a timely manner."
The Supreme Court held the submission procedure to be an invalid prior
restraint because Maryland had failed to adopt adequate safeguards to pre-
vent undue restraints upon free speech. a3 The Court ruled that only those
statutes containing adequate procedural safeguards against unnecessary cen-
sorship could withstand constitutional attack under Near's prior restraint
doctrine."
In Freedman, the state sought to promote a legitimate end: preventing the
spread of obscene movies. Yet the means chosen, a state board of censors,
had the effect of unduly inhibiting the exhibition of constitutionally pro-
tected films as well.4 5 Therefore, the Court determined that state efforts to
reach such illegal activity must be pursued by more narrowly tailored
means.4 6 Though Freedman involved a statute aimed predominantly at re-
stricting content (obscene movies), as opposed to conduct, the Court's deci-
sion nevertheless reflected a continued adherence to the Near principle that a
statute's validity rests in large part upon the practical effects of its
application.
Similarly, in Schneider v. State,4 7 the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered the issue whether a local township could combat litter by prohibiting
42. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59. Though the Freedman Court addressed state regulation
of films, it relied upon principles previously articulated in cases involving state efforts to ban
allegedly obscene books. Id. at 58 (citing A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964);
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Manuel Enter., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478
(1962); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961)). The Court observed that "[tihe
teaching of [these] cases is that, because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceed-
ing ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a
judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint." Id. (citations omitted).
43. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59-60; see also Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S.
308, 315 (1980) ("the regulation of a communicative activity such as the exhibition of motion
pictures must adhere to more narrowly drawn procedures than is necessary for the abatement
of an ordinary nuisance").
44. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58. The Court established three procedural safeguards to be
adhered to by any noncriminal process requiring the prior submission of films to a censor. See
id. at 58-59. First, a censor must bear the burden of proof that the film in question is unpro-
tected by the first amendment. Id. at 58. Second, an adversarial, prompt, and final adjudica-
tion on the issue of obscenity must be assured. Id. Third, any prior restraint before judicial
review must be strictly limited in duration. Id. at 58-59. "Without these safeguards," the
Court observed, "it may prove too burdensome to seek review of the censor's determina-
tion .... The exhibitor's stake in any one picture may be insufficient to warrant a protracted
and onerous course of litigation." Id. at 59.
45. Id. at 59-60.
46. Id. at 58. In effect, the Court condoned a limited form of prior restraint upon the
exhibition of potentially obscene movies, provided that Maryland adopted constitutionally pro-
tected procedures to prevent unnecessary infringements upon legitimate forms of expression.
Id. at 58-59.
47. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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the distribution of leaflets on city streets without a permit.48 Reiterating
Near's emphasis on testing the effect of a challenged statute, the Supreme
Court held that such regulations were an unconstitutional form of censor-
ship, because they unduly inhibited the free flow of information and opinion
guaranteed under the first amendment.49 The need to keep streets clean was
deemed an insufficient reason to justify ordinances which effectively prohib-
ited persons rightfully on a public street from handing literature to those
willing to receive it.5" Instead, the Court suggested that a more acceptable
means of combating litter would be to punish those who actually threw such
leaflets on the streets. 5
As Near and Schneider make clear, the validity of a regulation that in-
fringes upon first amendment rights will be measured not only by the stated
goals and language of a statute but also by its actual application and effect
upon those it reaches. At some point, an incidental burden upon fundamen-
tal rights becomes one which significantly restricts them. When faced with a
regulation that alleges to place such a burden upon first amendment inter-
ests, the Court will weigh the effect of the regulation on such freedoms
against the state's interests promoted by its application. As such, in Schnei-
der, the state's interest in keeping streets clean and preventing litter could
not override the severe restrictions placed upon the first amendment rights
of individuals wishing to disseminate leaflets on public streets. Finally, as
demonstrated by the Court's ruling in Freedman, limited restraints on first
amendment rights may be condoned where legitimate state interests are pro-
moted, such as preventing the spread of obscene materials or maintaining
community health standards, provided that constitutionally acceptable pro-
cedural safeguards are in place. 52
It must be remembered, however, that not all regulations adversely affect-
ing first amendment rights are aimed at the content of specific materials, as
was the case in Near (libelous publications) and Freedman (obscene mov-
48. Id. at 154-59.
49. Id. at 163-64; see also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (Court voided
an ordinance which forbade distribution of literature of any kind without written permit from
city manager).
50. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162. While a ban on the distribution of leaflets on city streets
might be the most efficient way to combat litter, the Court stated that "considerations of this
sort do not empower a municipality to abridge freedom of speech and press." Id. at 164. In
dicta, however, the Court emphasized that such freedom was not absolute. Id. at 160. For
example, a person could not exercise this liberty by lying down in the middle of a crowded
street, contrary to traffic regulations, and block traffic; nor could pamphleteers block innocent
pedestrians' right of way on the street until they accepted a tendered leaflet. Id.
51. Id. at 160-61.
52. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
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ies). 53 Often a state regulation, like a nuisance statute, will be aimed at abat-
ing and preventing the recurrence of illegal conduct wherever it is found
because it poses a threat to the public health, safety, and welfare. 54 When
illegal activity arguably contains elements of expression, however, the ques-
tion then becomes one of determining when, and to what extent, such con-
duct should be afforded first amendment protection.55 Thus, judicial review
in this context becomes two-fold. The Court will look at the overall effect of
a statute upon protected forms of expression, and will also examine the con-
duct itself.56 Whether the Court categorizes the conduct at issue as expres-
sive, nonexpressive, or both, becomes critical because a challenged statute
cannot be said to infringe first amendment freedoms if such conduct lacks
significant elements of protected expression.57
II. THE O'BRIEN TEST: WEIGHING THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT
REGULATION UPON CONDUCT CONTAINING SPEECH
AND NONSPEECH
Expanding upon the operations and effect analysis of Near and its prog-
eny, the Supreme Court in United States v. O'Brien 58 was concerned primar-
ily with formulating legal criteria to determine whether a government
regulation aimed at nonexpressive conduct had an adverse or merely inci-
dental effect upon first amendment rights.59 Put another way, the Court
attempted to determine the point at which the restraint of a government
regulation upon first amendment rights was so remote that the state's inter-
ests promoted by the statute easily outweighed any perceived threat to pro-
tected forms of expression.6 °
O'Brien was convicted for violating section 462(b) of the Universal Mili-
tary Training and Service Act of 194861 because he burned his draft card in
53. For case law supporting the proposition that first amendment protection is greatest
where the government attempts to restrain future expression because of its content, see New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam); Organization for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1971).
54. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
55. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 5, § 12-7, at 598-601.
56. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969) (black arm bands worn by students to protest Vietmam War, in violation of school
policy, constituted expressive conduct protected by the first amendment).
57. See, e.g., California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972) (statute prohibiting bars and
nightclubs from displaying movies or live entertainment containing certain acts of sexual con-
duct did not violate first amendment because such "performances" partook more of gross sex-
uality than of communication); see also supra note 20.
58. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
59. Id. at 367-77.
60. Id.
61. As amended by Congress in 1965, § 462(b) deemed an offender any person who
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public to protest the Vietnam War.62 The Court characterized O'Brien's
behavior as manifesting elements of both speech and conduct, stating that a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonexpressive
aspect of his action (burning the draft card) could well justify any incidental
burden on the speech element.63 Under what has become known as the
"O'Brien test," the Court held that the state may legitimately regulate
nonexpressive conduct even if it adversely affects a protected element of
speech contained in the same course of conduct, provided that four criteria
are satisfied. 64 First, the regulation must be a constitutional exercise of the
government's power.65 Second, it must further a compelling state interest.
66
Third, the regulation must bear no relation to the suppression of expres-
sion. 67 Fourth, any incidental burden upon first amendment rights which
results from the application of the regulation must be no greater than neces-
sary to promote the compelling state interest.
68
The Court concluded that the statutory amendment outlawing the de-
struction of draft cards met the first element of the test because it was within
the constitutional power of the federal government to enact laws necessary
to promote military preparedness.69  The second prong was met because
draft certificates advanced the government's interest in a smoothly function-
ing Selective Service System.7" Because the Court was satisfied that this in-
terest in administrative efficiency bore no relation to the suppression of
speech, the regulation satisfied the third element of the test.7 Finally, be-
"forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such
[selective service registration] certificate." 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(b)(3) (1982).
62. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369.
63. Id. at 376. O'Brien alleged that the act of burning his draft card was protected "sym-
bolic speech" within the first amendment and, in effect, encompassed the "communication of
ideas by conduct." Id. Rejecting this presumption, the Court stated: "We cannot accept the
view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labelled 'speech' whenever the
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." Id. But cf Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974) (per curiam) (alteration of United States flag in
violation of statute held a constitutionally protected form of symbolic speech). See generally
Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29
(1973); Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1091 (1968).
64. 391 U.S. at 376-77.




69. Id. For support of the proposition that the constitutional power of Congress to raise
and support armies is broad and sweeping, see Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 755-58
(1948); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 368-70 (1918).
70. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 381.
71. Id. at 381-82. O'Brien alleged that the purpose behind § 462(b)(3) was to suppress
freedom of speech, particularly the speech of those protesting the Vietnam War, and was,
therefore, unconstitutional. Id. at 382-83. The Court rejected this argument, stating that it
1987]
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cause the statute was sufficiently limited to the noncommunicative aspect of
O'Brien's conduct, the act of burning his draft card, and sought only to en-
sure the promotion of a legitimate governmental interest, the fourth prong
was met as well.72 As a result, the Court upheld the validity of O'Brien's
conviction under the statute.7 3
An important aspect of the O'Brien test was its requirement that a regula-
tion not place any greater burden on first amendment freedoms than neces-
sary to promote a compelling state interest. The Court's use of such
language represented an incorporation of "least restrictive means" principles
into its analysis, a first amendment doctrine perhaps best illustrated by the
Supreme Court case of Shelton v. Tucker.74 In Shelton, Arkansas teachers
were required by statute to file an affidavit each year detailing all the organi-
zations to which they belonged or to which they had contributed in the past
five years.75 Shelton's teaching contract was not renewed because he refused
to file such an affidavit.7 6 While recognizing Arkansas' legitimate interest in
assuring the competency and fitness of its teachers, the Supreme Court nev-
ertheless struck down the statute because it had unnecessarily and indiscrim-
inately infringed upon Shelton's protected associational freedoms under the
first amendment. 77 In the Court's view, requiring a teacher to list every con-
ceivable associational tie, whether professional, political, avocational, or reli-
gious, had little, if any, bearing upon his occupational competence or
fitness. 78 The Court held that, in promoting its legitimate interests, Arkan-
would not be a proper function of the judiciary to scrutinize the legislative motive behind an
otherwise constitutional statute. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 382. But see Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 361 (1931), in which the
Supreme Court considered a statute that prohibited people from expressing their opposition to
organized government by displaying "any flag, badge, banner, or device." The Court ruled
that such a measure was aimed at suppressing communication and, therefore, could not be
upheld as a valid regulation of noncommunicative conduct. Id. at 368-70.
74. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). As Shelton makes abundantly clear, even if the purpose behind a
regulation is legitimate and substantial, "it cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of
legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same
basic purpose." Id. at 488 (footnotes omitted). See generally Note, Less Drastic Means and
the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
75. Shelton, 364 U.S. at 480-81. The record at trial revealed that petitioner Shelton was
not a member of the Communist Party, nor was he a member of any organization advocating
the overthrow by force of the United States Government. Id. at 483. He was, however, a
member of the NAACP. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 490. The Court expressed concern over the fact that the information filed under
the statute was not confidential, thereby creating a risk of public disclosure and antagonizing
superiors by belonging to unpopular groups. Id. at 486.
78. Id. at 488.
First Amendment
sas would have to use means which were, unlike those imposed on Shelton,
the least restrictive of speech possible.
79
A. The Absence of a Substantial State Interest
The Supreme Court has applied the O'Brien test, or a substantially similar
analysis, in reviewing zoning ordinances which had purposes other than sup-
pressing protected speech, but which nevertheless had incidental effects on
speech.8° As a result, the Court has weighed the state's justifications for the
regulation at issue against the burden imposed upon first amendment
freedoms.
In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,"' the Court struck down a zoning
ordinance prohibiting all live entertainment-including nude dancing-in
specific commercial areas.8 2 The Court concluded that zoning ordinances,
like any other ordinance, have to be narrowly drawn and further a substan-
tial state interest to justify an infringement upon first amendment rights.83
79. Id. at 488-90; see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770-71 (1976) (although state has a legitimate interest in promot-
ing professional standard in pharmaceutical industry, it must use less drastic means than a
complete ban on the advertisement of prescription drug prices).
80. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71-73 (1976) (where the
Supreme Court upheld a Detroit zoning law which had dispersed, but not totally banned,
nonobscene adult movies). In this plurality opinion, Justice Powell concurred on the basis of
O'Brien, stating "[t]he inquiry for First Amendment purposes is not concerned with [the] eco-
nomic impact [of the zoning ordinance]; rather, it looks only to the effect of this ordinance
upon freedom of expression." Id. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring).
In applying O'Brien to Detroit's disputed zoning ordinance, Justice Powell carefully scruti-
nized the city's justification for the restrictions imposed upon adult movie theatres, and con-
cluded that the need to prevent urban deterioration and promote stable residential and
commercial neighborhoods were legitimate, substantial interests. Id. at 80-82 (Powell, J., con-
curring). He also found the burden imposed upon first amendment interests "incidental and
minimal" because "Detroit has silenced no message, has invoked no censorship, and has im-
posed no limitation upon those who wish to view [adult movies]." Id. at 78 (Powell, J., con-
curring).
For a more recent application of O'Brien principles by the Supreme Court, see Members of
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810 (1984) (ordinance prohibiting post-
ing of signs on public property curtailed no more speech than necessary to accomplish city's
esthetic goal, since it was the medium itself which created the problem).
81. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
82. Id. at 65. The Court stressed early in its opinion that an entertainment program fea-
turing nudity would not necessarily put it beyond first amendment protections. Id. at 66; see
also Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (occasional scenes of nudity in movie "Car-
nal Knowledge" held insufficient grounds to prosecute exhibitor of film because "nudity alone
is not enough to make material legally obscene under the Miller standards").
83. Schad, 452 U.S. at 68; see, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977)
(the Court struck down a zoning ordinance which limited the occupancy of dwellings to a
single family). By its definition of "family," the ordinance at issue in Moore prevented certain
relatives from living together and, as a result, the Court held that it impermissibly infringed
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In the Court's view, the borough failed to advance a compelling interest that
could justify excluding all live entertainment while permitting a variety of
other commercial uses in the restricted zones.8 4 Problems associated with
live entertainment, such as parking, trash, and police protection were found
to be an insufficient state interest, particularly since other permitted com-
mercial activities in the borough produced the same problems.8 5 Moreover,
the Court reasoned that a total ban on live entertainment precluded any
alternative channels of communication for such protected expression in the
borough.8 6 In the Court's view, it was insufficient for Mount Ephraim offi-
cials to contend that such entertainment was amply available in neighboring
towns; such alternatives must also exist within the borough itself8 7
Schad reflected the Court's continued adherence to the Near principle of
examining an ordinance by its operation and effect. Here, the operation of
Mount Ephraim's land-use ordinance had the effect of infringing upon pro-
tected first amendment freedoms. Equally important to the Court's analysis
in Schad was its rejection of the compelling interests advanced by Mount
Ephraim to justify the restrictions placed upon free speech. Such scrutiny by
the Court was consistent with the constitutional values previously articu-
lated in O'Brien's four-part test.
In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Reve-
upon protected liberty interests. Id. at 499-500; cf Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1,
7-9 (1974) (zoning ordinance restricting use of land to one-family dwellings upheld because it
affected only unrelated persons).
84. Schad, 452 U.S. at 74-75. In a specific reference to O'Brien, the Court also added that
-[e]ven where a challenged regulation restricts freedom of expression only incidentally or only
in a small number of cases, we have scrutinized the governmental interest furthered by the
regulation and have stated that the regulation must be narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary
intrusion on freedom of expression." Id. at 69 n.7 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 376-77 (1968)).
85. Id. at 73.
86. Id. at 75-76. By precluding live entertainment from the borough, Mount Ephraim's
zoning regulation fell beyond the reach of American Mini Theatres' holding and, instead, ran
headlong into its dicta, which had warned "[t]he situation would be quite different if the ordi-
nance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful speech." 427 U.S.
50, 71 n.35 (1976); see also Schad, 452 U.S. at 78 (Blackmun, J., concurring), where Justice
Blackmun noted:
It would be a substantial step beyond Mini Theatres to conclude that a town or
county may legislatively prevent its citizens from engaging in or having access to
forms of protected expression that are incompatible with its majority's conception of
the 'decent life' solely because these activities are sufficiently available in other
locales.
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
87. Schad, 452 U.S. at 76. The Court relied in part upon the principle stated in Schneider,
308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939), that "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."
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nue,ss the Court applied the O'Brien analysis to a regulation aimed exclu-
sively at nonexpressive conduct yet found to impose a disproportionate
burden upon those engaged in first amendment activity.8 9 Minnesota had
placed a tax90 upon the use of large quantities of newsprint and ink, products
used primarily in the newspaper and periodical businesses. 91 The Supreme
Court found that the tax violated the first amendment because newspapers
were effectively singled out to shoulder the fiscal burden, and Minnesota
failed to articulate a sufficiently important state interest to justify such dispa-
rate treatment. 92 Though never specifically applying the O'Brien test, the
Court's analysis in Minneapolis Star invoked its spirit. First, the Court
agreed with Minnesota that it was within the state's constitutional powers to
impose a generally applicable economic regulation upon the press.9 3 Next,
the majority considered whether Minnesota had advanced a sufficiently im-
portant governmental interest to justify the burden that had been placed
upon the press.94 The Court concluded that Minnesota's interest in raising
revenue, in and of itself, could not justify such an effect upon the press,
88. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
89. Id.
90. Often referred to as a "use tax," this fiscal measure was designed to protect a state's
sales tax by eliminating its residents' incentive to travel to states with lower sales taxes to buy
goods rather then buying them in their own state. Id. at 577. In 1974, the Minnesota Legisla-
ture amended the use tax applied to publications by exempting the first $100,000 worth of ink
and paper consumed in a calendar year, thereby giving each publication a tax credit of $4000
per year. Id. at 577-78. The resulting effect was that only a few publications each year wound
up paying any tax. For example, in 1974, 388 newspapers were eligible for taxation under the
regulation. Id. at 578. The Minneapolis Star & Tribune, however, was one of 11 newspapers
upon whom taxes were imposed. Id. The Minneapolis Star & Tribune paid roughly two-thirds
of the total tax revenue collected by the state. Id.
91. Id. at 592-93.
92. Id. at 586-90. The Court noted that Minnesota's treatment of publications differed
from that of other businesses in two ways. First, it imposed a use tax that didn't serve the
function of protecting its sales tax. Id. at 581. Second, it taxed an intermediate transaction
rather than the final retail sale. Id. In the Court's view, singling out the press for such a
burdensome tax now would open the door to similar attempts in the future, thereby reducing
the Minnesota legislature's incentive to consider taxes of general applicability. Id. at 585.
"That threat," the Court observed, "can operate as effectively as a censor to check critical
comment by the press, undercutting the basic assumption of our political system that the press
will often serve as an important restraint on government." Id.
93. Id. at 581; see also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (first part of
O'Brien test-"a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government").
94. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 586-90; see also O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (second part of
O'Brien test-"a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it... furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest"). For a later case upholding this O'Brien principle, see
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1982) (tax which burdens rights protected by the
first amendment cannot stand unless it is necessary to achieve an overriding governmental
interest).
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because alternative means of taxing businesses generally were available. 95
The Court also noted that regulations subjecting the press to differential
treatment traditionally had raised concerns regarding the motivations be-
hind such measures.96 As a result, the Court refused to recognize an inher-
ent power in the state to single out the press for such disproportionate tax
action because it presented too great an opportunity for abuse in the form of
censorship.9 7
Schad and Minneapolis Star pinpoint two important factors likely to trig-
ger the Court's application of O'Brien analysis. First, O'Brien is more likely
to be applied where a statute regulates conduct with an expressive element.
In Schad, protected forms of expression, such as nude dancing, were unduly
burdened by a zoning ordinance that sought to ban all live entertainment
from certain commercial areas. Second, even if a statute's purpose is unre-
lated to the suppression of speech, the O'Brien analysis may still be invoked
if speech is adversely affected in the process. In Minneapolis Star, a tax ex-
clusively aimed at nonexpressive conduct-publication production activi-
ties-was invalidated because its fiscal burden exclusively fell upon the press.
In each case, the Court applied O'Brien-related principles to determine
whether the regulated conduct contained an expressive element and whether
the statute at issue adversely affected speech.
B. The Evolving Speech-Conduct Dichotomy
Recent applications of O'Brien continue to focus upon government regula-
tions that restrict conduct with both an expressive and nonexpressive ele-
ment.98 In Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence,99 demonstrators
involved in an around-the-clock rally on The Mall and in Lafayette Park in
the District of Columbia to protest the plight of the homeless brought suit
95. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 586-87; see also O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (fourth part of
O'Brien test-"a government regulation is sufficiently justified if ... the incidental restriction
on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of...
[the governmental] interest"). In dicta, the Court suggested that Minnesota's efforts to raise
revenue could have been just as easily accomplished by "taxing businesses generally, [thereby]
avoiding the censorial threat implicit in a tax that singles out the press." Minneapolis Star, 460
U.S. at 586 (footnote omitted).
96. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585; see also O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (third part of
O'Brien test-"a government regulation is sufficiently justified ... if the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression"). Though not wishing to question the legis-
lative motives behind Minnesota's use tax against the press, the Court did pointedly observe
that "differential treatment, unless justified by some special characteristic of the press, suggests
that the goal of the regulation is not unrelated to suppression of expression." Minneapolis
Star, 460 U.S. at 585.
97. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 592-93.
98. See, e.g., City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
99. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
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challenging a National Park Service regulation prohibiting overnight sleep-
ing or camping in public parks. " Though recognizing, arguendo, that sleep
in this case was a form of expressive conduct,'' the Court nevertheless re-
fused to strike down the Park Service regulation on first amendment
grounds, viewing it instead as a content neutral means of promoting the gov-
ernment's legitimate interest in preserving its parks.'0 2 The majority ex-
plained that a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on speech is
not invalidated merely because ordinarily nonexpressive conduct (sleep) sud-
denly acquires expressive elements.'0 3 More importantly, the Court noted
that the Park Service's prohibition against overnight sleeping did not prevent
the demonstrators from communicating their message on behalf of the
homeless through alternative means." Symbolic tent cities and signs were
left intact by the Park Service and demonstrators had ample access to the
news media."0 5 In addition, the regulation narrowly focused on the govern-
ment's substantial interest in maintaining its parks in an attractive and ac-
cessible condition without evidencing any intent to suppress speech.
0 6
In United States v. Albertini, 17 the Supreme Court stressed that the
O'Brien analysis would not invalidate a content-neutral regulation restricting
100. Id. at 290. Under the regulations applicable in Clark, camping in National Parks was
permitted only on campgrounds that were specifically designated for such purposes. Id. (citing
36 C.F.R. § 50.27(a) (1983)). Lafayette Park and The Mall were not designated for such pur-
poses. Id.
101. Id. at 293. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger strongly opposed such an
assumption. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring). He argued that the attempts at camping in the
park constituted a form of "picketing" and therefore was conduct, not speech, in violation of
valid National Park Service regulation. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
For an earlier example of the Court's reluctance to extend first amendment protections to
illegal noncommunicative conduct containing an "artificial" element of expression, see Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973) (conduct or depictions of conduct that a state
legitimately could prohibit in public would receive no greater protection by moving indoors to
a theatre, any more than "a man and woman locked in sexual embrace at high noon in Times
Square [would be] protected by the Constitution because they simultaneously engage[d] in a
valid political dialogue").
102. Clark, 468 U.S. at 295-96. See generally Farber, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment.: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980); Redish, The Content Distinction in
First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981).
103. Clark, 468 U.S. at 296-98.
104. Id. at 295.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 296. Implicit in the Court's reasoning was a fear that if they were to allow an
overnight camping demonstration in this case, the Park Service would thereafter be inundated
with similar requests for permits by other groups demanding the right to assert their message.
Id. at 297. Such a scenario, in the Court's view, would threaten the federal government's
ability to protect and maintain the parks "in an attractive and intact condition, readily avail-
able to the millions of people who wish to see and enjoy them by their presence." Id. at 296.
107. 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
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expressive conduct so long as it "promote[d] a substantial governmental in-
terest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation."' 8 The
statute at issue in Albertini made it unlawful to reenter a military base after
having received a commanding officer's official notice not to do so.' 9 Alber-
tini was convicted of violating this prohibition after he reentered Hickam
Air Force Base during its annual open house day to join friends participating
in a peaceful demonstration. 11 The Court, reaffirming Clark, upheld the
validity of the statute, and determined that the first amendment would not
bar application of a content-neutral regulation that incidentally burdened
speech merely because a party contended that granting an exception in their
case would not threaten important governmental interests."' For purposes
of O'Brien, the Court was satisfied that the government's legitimate interest
in preserving security at its military bases could not be furthered as effec-
tively through less drastic means.'' 2
In considering the implications of the above mentioned cases, several com-
mon threads of first amendment analysis emerge. As Near evidenced, the
operation and effect of a statute challenged on first amendment grounds will
be carefully assessed." 3 If the threat of prior restraint or censorship is re-
vealed, as in Freedman, the Court will be strongly compelled to invalidate
the statute at issue, absent some state showing of adequate procedural safe-
guards to protect legitimate forms of expression." 4 Another important con-
108. Id. at 688-89. Rejecting the least restrictive means implications of part four of the
O'Brien test, the Court stated that a regulation would not be invalidated "simply because there
is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech." Id. at 699 (footnotes
omitted). For a discussion of O'Brien and the tradeoffs inherent in attempting to fashion less
restrictive means to regulate speech, see Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1485
(1975) ("[in] virtually every case involving real legislation, a more perfect fit involves some
added cost") (footnotes omitted).
109. Albertini, 472 U.S. at 677-78.
110. Id. at 678. Albertini's friends were protesting the nuclear arms race; they gathered in
front of a B-52 bomber and displayed a banner proclaiming "Carnival of Death" and then they
proceeded to pass out leaflets while Albertini took pictures of the displays. Id.
111. Id. at 688; see also Clark v. Community for Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296-97
(1984) ("the validity of this regulation need not be judged solely by reference to the demonstra-
tion at hand" (citing Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 652-53 (1981))).
112. Albertini, 472 U.S. at 688. The Court reached the very same conclusion in Clark, 468
U.S. at 297, when it observed "if the parks would be more exposed to harm without the sleep-
ing prohibition than with it, the ban is safe from invalidation under the First Amendment."
113. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (discussing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931)); see also Albertini, 472 U.S. at 688-89 ("[rlegulations that burden speech inciden-
tally or control the time, place, and manner of expression must be evaluated in terms of their
general effect").
114. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965); supra note 44 and accompany-
ing text; see also Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 71 (1963) (statute creating state
[Vol. 37:191
First Amendment
sideration in the eyes of the Court will be the state interest put forth to
justify a regulation that infringes upon first amendment rights. In O'Brien,
the government's asserted interest in national defense was held sufficiently
compelling to justify the burden its regulation placed upon those who wished
to engage in forms of symbolic speech." 5 In Schneider, however, the Court
held that the state's interest in preventing litter was not sufficiently substan-
tial to justify the detrimental effect its anti-litter ordinance had on an indi-
vidual's right to disseminate leaflets to those willing to receive them." 6
Ultimately, the Court will weigh the effects of a regulation on free speech
against the state interests promoted by the regulation. Finally, as Clark and
Albertini suggest, the Court will no longer move so swiftly, as it did in
Shelton, to strike down an otherwise valid statute merely because a hypo-
thetical less restrictive means is asserted to accomplish the same end sought
by the regulation.117
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT MEETS NUISANCE LAW
The regulation at issue in Arcara was a New York Public Health Law
designed to abate as a public health nuisance any and all premises involved
in prostitution, lewdness, or assignation. 1 '8 When an undercover investiga-
tion by the Erie County Sheriff's Department discovered various illicit sex-
ual activities "' occurring on the premises of the Village Books and News
Store,' 2 ° the district attorney's office brought a civil action seeking its clo-
sure.' 21 In answer to the complaint filed against it, Cloud Books, the opera-
tor of the premises, denied the Sheriff's Department's allegations that such
sexual activity took place with its knowledge 122 and moved for partial sum-
commission to screen allegedly obscene materials amounted to a prior restraint upon distribu-
tion of publications).
115. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
118. 119 Misc. 2d 505, 507, 465 N.Y.S.2d 633, 635, aff'd, 101 A.D.2d 163, 475 N.Y.S.2d
173 (1984), modified, 65 N.Y.2d 324, 480 N.E.2d 1089, 491 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1985), rev'd, 106 S.
Ct. 3172 (1986); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
119. People ex rel. Arcara, 119 Misc. 2d at 506, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 635; see also supra note 14
and accompanying text.
120. The Village Books and News, operated by Cloud Books, Inc., sold sexually explicit
books and magazines while also providing booths for the viewing of sexually explicit movies.
People ex rel. Arcara, 119 Misc. 2d at 506, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 635. It is important to note that at
all levels of judicial review of this case, obscenity was not at issue.
121. Id., 465 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
122. Id. at 507, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 635. This crucial point of contention was never resolved
conclusively at any level of the proceedings. In his sworn affidavit, the deputy sheriff who
observed the illicit sexual conduct on the premises stated that he approached bookstore em-
ployees about this activity but was told by them that they were not concerned with such behav-
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mary judgment on first amendment grounds arguing that closure of its book-
store would amount to a prior restraint of protected materials. 2 3 The Trial
Division of the New York Supreme Court, Special Term, denied the motion
for partial summary judgment, holding that it would not permit the consti-
tutional protections normally accorded bookselling activities to be employed
as "a curtain behind which illegal activity could be freely encouraged and
conducted."1
24
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed, finding the unlaw-
ful sexual activities lacked any expressive element that could possibly war-
rant first amendment protection.125 Before the New York Court of Appeals,
Cloud Books won a reversal of the closure order on first amendment
grounds.' 26 The New York Court of Appeals determined that the four-part
O'Brien test was the required standard of review to measure the impact of
the closure order upon Cloud Book's bookselling activities.' 2 7 In so doing,
the court of appeals concluded that an order closing the premises for a year
ior "as long as the persons involved also spent some money on the books, magazines, or movie
machines in the store." People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 324, 326, 480
N.E.2d 1089, 1091-92, 491 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1986). Cloud
Books specifically denied that it had condoned any illicit sexual activity, stating that its em-
ployees were required to maintain a strictly enforced policy of disallowing such conduct on the
premises. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 101 A.D.2d 163, 165, 475 N.Y.S.2d 173,
176 (1984), modified, 65 N.Y.2d 324, 480 N.E.2d 1089, 491 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1985), rev'd, 106 S.
Ct. 3172 (1986).
123. People ex rel. Arcara, 119 Misc. 2d at 508-09, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 636. Cloud Books also
argued that the statute was not intended to reach establishments other than those premises
that would normally be thought of as houses of prostitution. Id., 465 N.Y.S.2d at 636. This
contention, however, was quickly put aside at each level of review. People ex rel. Arcara, 65
N.Y.2d at 329-31, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 311-13; see also People v. Macbeth Realty Co., 63 A.D.2d
908, 908-09, 406 N.Y.S.2d 298, 298 (1978) (New York's nuisance statute upheld as applied to
certain rooms used for prostitution in a hotel).
124. People ex rel. Arcara, 119 Misc. 2d at 512, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
125. People ex rel. Arcara, 101 A.D.2d at 163, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 173. Addressing Cloud
Books' contentions, the appellate division observed, "closure of the bookstore pursuant to ...
[New York's] Public Health Law would not constitute a prior restraint on protected First
Amendment speech since the People seek only to employ the statute to enjoin illegal conduct
occurring on the premises, not to regulate the content of materials disseminated by the store."
Id. at 172, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 180.
126. People ex rel. Arcara, 65 N.Y.2d at 337, 480 N.E.2d at 1099, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
The court of appeals concluded that the closure of Cloud Books was not "essential to the
furtherance of the purposes underlying title II," since no less restrictive means had yet been
attempted to abate the existing nuisance, including the very real possibility for injunctive relief
under the statute if the District Attorney was to prevail at trial. Id., 480 N.E.2d at 1099, 491
N.Y.S.2d at 317. Though the court of appeals recognized that a closure order would be the
most efficient remedy in this situation, it nevertheless maintained that "considerations of this
sort do not empower a [state] to abridge freedom of speech." Id., 480 N.E.2d at 1099, 491
N.Y.S.2d at 317 (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939)).
127. Id. at 335-36, 480 N.E.2d at 1098, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
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was much broader than necessary to achieve the state's restriction against
illicit sexual conduct.' 2 8
In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court reversed.' 29 Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Burger held that the first amendment did not bar
enforcement of New York's nuisance statute against Cloud Books.' 3 ° The
Chief Justice found that the New York legislature properly sought to protect
the environment of the community at large by directing its closure sanctions
at premises used for lawless activities.13'
As for the first amendment claims raised by Cloud Books, the majority
held that the New York Court of Appeals misread O'Brien. 132 The Court
determined that O'Brien was irrelevant to a statute directed at imposing
punishment on nonexpressive activity.133 The majority reasoned that merely
linking the words "sex" and "books" would not trigger first amendment pro-
tections for illegal sexual conduct.' 34 More importantly, the Court deter-
mined that because the nonexpressive sexual conduct at issue bore no
connection to any expressive activity, it was subject to general state regula-
128. Id. at 337, 480 N.E.2d at 1099, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 317. The court of appeals looked to a
Virginia case, Commonwealth v. Croatan Books, Inc., 228 Va. 383, 391, 323 S.E.2d 86, 90
(1984) to support its less drastic means approach, noting that it was only after temporary
injunctive relief had failed to abate illicit sexual conduct on the premises of an adult bookstore
that the Virginia Supreme Court implemented a mandatory one-year closure order. 65 N.Y.2d
at 337, 480 N.E. 2d at 1099, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 317. But cf Commonwealth ex rel. Lewis v.
Allouwill Realty Corp., 330 Pa. Super. 32, 41-42, 478 A.2d 1334, 1339 (1984), in which the
Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld an order closing two bookstores padlocked for one year
due to the repeated occurrence of illegal sexual activities on the premises. Although the supe-
rior court recognized that closure might have an incidental effect on the dissemination of pro-
tected materials, it nevertheless rejected the defendant's first amendment argument, noting that
it was conceivable that the bookstore operator could continue to sell his books elsewhere. Id.
at 40, 478 A.2d at 1338-39.
129. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 3172, 3178 (1986).
130. Id. The Court stressed that "bookselling in an establishment used for prostitution
does not confer First Amendment coverage to defeat a valid statute aimed at penalizing and
terminating illegal uses of premises." Id. This categorization by the majority-"bookselling
in an establishment used for prostitution"-suggests that it believed Cloud Books was aware
of, and condoned, the illegal behavior occurring on its premises.
131. Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3178.
132. Id. at 3178. As the majority observed, "[the] crucial distinction between the circum-
stances presented in O'Brien and the circumstances of this case [is that] unlike the symbolic
draft card burning in O'Brien. the sexual activity carried on in this case manifests absolutely no
element of protected expression." Id. at 3176-77; see also supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
133. Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3178.
134. Id. at 3177. The "sex" and "books" rationale can also be found in the Court's obscen-
ity law opinions. See e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 n.7 (1973) ("[a] quotation from
Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will not constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene
publication").
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tion. 13  Nor could it be found, in the Court's view, that New York's nui-
sance statute disproportionately burdened bookstores or others engaged in
protected first amendment activities.' 36
Addressing Cloud Book's prior restraint concerns, the majority remained
unconvinced that such a danger was imminent,' 37 because the bookstore was
free to carry on its legitimate selling activities elsewhere.' 31 In addition, the
Court concluded that the closure proceedings had been initiated without any
predetermined intent to prohibit specific books or questionable materials. 139
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor emphasized that had such an
intent been present, it would have clearly implicated first amendment con-
cerns and required analysis under the appropriate first amendment standard
of review. t40
In dissent, Justice Blackmun chastised the majority for suggesting that
states could restrict speech as much as they pleased, with little or no justifi-
cation, provided they did so through generally applicable regulations aimed
at nonexpressive conduct.' 4 Reiterating the long-held principle of testing a
135. Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3177-78. This is a critical point of contention between Chief
Justice Burger's majority opinion and Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion, as evidenced in
their "battle of the footnotes." In Chief Justice Burger's view, first amendment analysis under
O'Brien is limited to those instances where regulated "nonspeech" activity is "intimately re-
lated to expressive conduct protected under the First Amendment." Id. at 3177 n.3. He cited
several cases to support his position, including Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972) (demonstration results in prosecution under antinoise ordinance) and Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (trespass in order to distribute religious materials). 106 S. Ct. 3172,
3177 n.3. In response, Justice Blackmun takes a broader view of O'Brien, stating that "our
concern clearly has been to avoid any excercise of governmental power that 'unduly sup-
press[es]' First Amendment interests." Id. at 3179 n.* (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940)) (emphasis in original).
136. Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3177; cf Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r
of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (discussed supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text).
137. See Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3177 n.2.
138. Id. But see Note, Pornography, Padlocks, and Prior Restraints.- The Constitutional
Limits of the Nuisance Power, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1478, 1506 (1983), in which it is contended
that:
the ability to disseminate material from other outlets may be illusory. In a small
town, for instance, the operator of a bookstore or theater may have nowhere else to
go . . . . In reality, shutting down a bookstore or theater may completely cut off
dissemination of the material in a locality, at least temporarily.
Id.
139. Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3178 n.4.
140. Id. at 3178 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Concurring in the majority's view that a first
amendment standard of review was erroneously applied by the New York Court of Appeals,
Justice O'Connor asserted that "[a]ny other conclusion would lead to the absurd result that
any government action that had some conceivable speech-inhibiting consequences, such as the
arrest of a newscaster for a traffic violation, would require analysis under the First Amend-
ment." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 3178-79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also took exception with
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statute by its operation and effect,' 4 2 Justice Blackmun argued that generally
applicable statutes directed at regulating nonexpressive conduct had always
been struck down if they "unduly penalized speech, political or other-
wise." '143 The dissent did not view the lack of an expressive element in the
sexual activity as dispositive in the case because the Court traditionally
avoided any exercise of governmental power which unduly suppressed first
amendment interests."' Though sympathetic to New York's legitimate in-
terest in forbidding sexual acts committed in a public place, the dissent
would have required state officials to employ less drastic means, 145 such as
arresting the patrons who actually committed the illegal activity.' 46 While
linking the words "sex" and "books" should not qualify one's illegal conduct
for first amendment protection, Justice Blackmun maintained that neither
should it totally disqualify first amendment protections for books located
near the site of such activity.' 4 7
The Court's opinion in Arcara departs from its earlier decisions in several
ways. 148 First, Near's operation and effects test receives a restrictive inter-
the analogy offered by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion to support her view that the
first amendment cannot prohibit every conceivable speech-inhibiting consequence of a govern-
ment regulation. Id. at 3180 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). According to Justice Blackmun,
"[t]he closure of a bookstore can no more be compared to a traffic arrest of a reporter.., than
the closure of a church could be compared to the traffic arrest of its clergyman." Id. (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 3179 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708-
09 (1931); supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
143. Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3179 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147, 165 (1939) (discussed supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text).
144. Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3179 n.* (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (state regulation forbidding distribution of religious material on
premises of company-owned town violates first amendment). Justice Blackmun also noted
that, under the majority's approach, a store selling books that induced browsing patrons to
commit illegal sexual acts on the premises would be entitled to more protection under the first
amendment than a bookstore selling materials having no such effect on the behavior of its
patrons. Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3179 n.* (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145. Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3180 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun complained
that the statute in effect "impose[d] absolute liability on the bookstore simply because the
activity occur[red] on the premises." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
146. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
147. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Justice Blackmun's view, a one-year mandatory
closure had a severe and unnecessary impact on the first amendment rights of booksellers and
therefore required the use of more "sensitive tools" to promote the state's interest in eliminat-
ing public lewdness. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
525 (1958)).
148. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965) (discussed supra notes 37-
46 and accompanying text); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (discussed supra notes
74-79 and accompanying text); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931) (discussed supra
notes 28-36 and accompanying text).
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pretation.14 9 Near and its progeny established the principle that the overall
operation and effect of a statute must be considered in judging its validity.
In Arcara, however, the Court essentially limited its focus to the New York
nuisance statute's effect upon the first amendment rights of those who en-
gaged in illicit sexual activity on Cloud Books' premises.15 ° Astonishingly,
the Court devoted little attention to the closure order's effect upon Cloud
Books' constitutionally protected bookselling activities.15 Implicit in the
Court's approach is the suggestion that such considerations were of secon-
dary importance, due to the nature of the illegal activities that occurred on
the bookstore's premises.'5 2
Perhaps this result is due to the unusual nature of the facts in Arcara.
Three separate parties were involved: the persons committing acts of prosti-
tution and lewdness; Cloud Books, as operator of the premises being closed;
and the State of New York, seeking through its police powers, to promote
the general public's health, safety, and welfare.' 53 Under O'Brien case law,
only two parties were involved; the state, and a person or persons involved in
some form of illegal activity containing an expressive element. For example,
in O'Brien, the government prosecuted an individual who had illegally
burned his draft card as a symbolic protest against the Vietnam War.' 54 In
Schneider, local government officials charged an individual with violation of
an anti-littering ordinance because he had distributed leaflets on a public
street.'5 5 In Clark, demonstrators seeking to protest the plight of the home-
less were denied a permit by National Park Service officials to sleep over-
night in federal parks because it violated applicable government
149. The majority reduced specific consideration of Near's principles to a single footnote,
Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3177 n.2, and the passing observation that, because "every civil and
criminal remedy imposes some conceivable burden on First Amendment protected activities,"
respondent could not complain that its bookselling activities were adversely affected by the
statutory closure remedy. Id. at 3177.
150. Id. at 3176-77.
151. Id. at 3177. Chief Justice Burger characterized as "dubious at best" Cloud Books'
claim that the effect of New York's statutory closure was to impermissibly burden its first
amendment protected bookselling activities. Id.
152. Throughout his opinion, Chief Justice Burger refers to the factual situation as one
involving "bookselling in an establishment used for prostitution." Id. 3178 (emphasis added);
see also id. at 3173. This suggests that the Chief Justice perceived Cloud Books as being first
and foremost an establishment designed to promote illicit sexual activities, with bookselling
being merely a "front" to retain legitimacy. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
Clearly, Chief Justice Burger was not about to establish a dangerous precedent by ruling in
favor of Cloud Books, no doubt envisioning every pimp and prostitute relocating to the back
rooms of bookstores and moviehouses were he to do so.
153. Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3173-74.
154. 391 U.S. 367, 369 (1968) (discussed supra notes 58-73 and accompanying text).
155. 308 U.S. 146, 158-59 (1939) (discussed supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text).
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regulations.' 56 In all three instances, speech and nonspeech elements were
wrapped up in the same individual's illegal conduct. In Arcara, however, the
speech adversely affected (bookselling activities of Cloud Books) and the
nonspeech which drew the closure penalty of New York's nuisance statute
(illegal acts of prostitution and lewdness committed on Cloud Books' prem-
ises) were not present in the same individual's conduct. Instead of examin-
ing how New York's closure provision stopped the legitimate sale of
constitutionally protected books, the Court limited its inquiry to whether the
illicit sexual activity manifested any element of expression worth protecting
from state regulation under the first amendment.' 57 As a result, the Court
easily justified the New York closure order.
The Court in Arcara also held that first amendment review of New York's
health regulation should never have been conducted in the first place. '58 In
a critical qualification to the applicability of O'Brien's four-part test, the
Court stressed that such analysis is triggered properly only where a statute
regulates nonexpressive activity intimately related to expressive conduct pro-
tected under the first amendment.'5 9 Absent this nexus, the Arcara decision
suggested that courts need not concern themselves with any other side effect
a statute may have upon protected expression.
Arcara also represented a further assault by the Court upon the applicabil-
ity of Shelton's least drastic means rationale.' 6 ° Continuing the line of
thought previously advanced in Albertini, 161 the majority stated that govern-
ment officials are not always required to adopt alternative means to enforce a
regulation that has infringed upon protected forms of expression.' 62 The
Court reasoned that regardless of the form taken, every civil or criminal
penalty adopted to enforce a statute will affect some first amendment rights
of those subject to its sanctions.' 63 As a result, the Court in Arcara chose
not to place the burden upon New York to find the least restrictive means
available to eradicate acts of prostitution and lewdness found on premises
engaged in legitimate bookselling activities. '64 Instead, the Court placed the
156. 468 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1984) (discussed supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text).
157. Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3177-78.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 3177 n.3.
160. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
162. Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3177.
163. Id.
164. On remand, the New York Court of Appeals refused to follow the Supreme Court's
decision. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553, 559, 503 N.E.2d 492,
495, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 (1986). The court held instead that, under New York's constitu-
tion, the state must "prove that in seeking to close [Cloud Books] it has chosen a course no
broader than necessary to accomplish it purpose." Id., 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d at
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burden on the owners of Cloud Books to find another place to conduct its
bookselling activities.
Borderline areas of protected speech, found in adult bookstores and
moviehouses, are especially at risk under the Court's analysis.' 65 Previously,
under Freedman's analysis, a state could only ban films or books that had
been determined to be obscene through constitutionally acceptable proce-
dures.' 6 6 New York's statute did not incorporate any such guidelines into
its regulatory scheme. The Court, however, did not find the absence of such
safeguards sufficient to trigger analysis under Freedman because the statute
was aimed at banning illegal conduct rather than the content of the materials
sold at Cloud Books. Such a conclusion also must be attributed to the
Court's narrow reading of Near, because its decision allows New York to
achieve indirectly through nuisance law that which it might not be able to
achieve directly through obscenity statutes-the banning of "undesirable"
forms of protected speech.
The Court's decision in Arcara also clarified the point at which the burden
of a state regulation upon protected expression becomes so incidental that it
is easily outweighed by state interests. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the
majority,167 and Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence,' 6 ' determined that
this point is reached when the regulated conduct manifests no expressive
element of its own, nor is closely connected to any other expressive activity.
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun countered that a regulation's burden upon
first amendment rights can only be described as "attenuated" after the state
has shown that it has employed the least restrictive means of pursuing its
847. The court, therefore, denied the order closing Cloud Books for one year because New
York officials failed to demonstrate that less drastic means were employed to abate the illicit
sexual activity. Id., 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847. A closure order would have been
justified had New York arrested the offenders or sought injunctive relief, and failed in these
efforts to abate the nuisance. Id., 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847. The court stressed
that:
The crucial factor in determining whether State action affects freedom of expression
is the impact of the action on the protected activity and not the nature of the activity
which prompted the government to act. The test, in traditional terms, is not who is
aimed at but who is hit.
Id., 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847. The court based its ruling on the traditionally
broader protections afforded freedom of expression under New York's constitution, stating
that "the minimal national standard established by the Supreme Court for First Amendment
rights cannot be considered dispositive in determining the scope of this State's constitutional
guarantee of freedom of expression." Id. at 557-58, 503 N.E.2d at 494-95, 510 N.Y.S.2d 846-
47.
165. Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3180 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166. 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (discussed supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text); see also
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731-33 (1961).
167. Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3172.
168. Id. at 3178 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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legitimate objectives.' 6 9 Since the majority in Arcara did not require New
York to make such a showing, the point at which Cloud Books' first amend-
ment rights could be thought of as incidentally burdened was reached much
sooner than it would have under the dissent's standard. This indicates a
loosening of the standard traditionally used by the Court to determine
whether a state regulation has more than just a minimal effect upon first
amendment rights.
By overemphasizing the illegal sexual conduct in this case, and downplay-
ing the constitutional implications of closing a bookstore, the Court is signal-
ing state and local authorities that a broader application of their police
powers, at the expense of individual rights, will not necessarily be invalid.
By upholding the closure of Cloud Books for one year, the Court unduly
encouraged state and local officials to abandon legitimate attempts at abating
public nuisances by the least restrictive means available to them. As a result
of this decision, a bookstore will be shut down for one year, while those who
engaged in the illicit sexual conduct that drew the closure penalty move on
to "obscener pastures."
IV. CONCLUSION
In Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the first
amendment did not bar enforcement of a statute authorizing closure of
premises found to be used as a place for prostitution and lewdness simply
because the premises were also used as an adult bookstore. It further held
that United States v. O'Brien had no relevance to a statute directed at impos-
ing sanctions on nonexpressive activity. Merely linking the words "sex" and
"books" will not confer first amendment protection on otherwise illegal
nonexpressive conduct.
As a result of its decision, the Court makes clear that it will not allow the
first amendment to be used as a device to foster illegal conduct and escape
valid state regulations. Yet by adopting this posture, the Court also discards
the procedural and substantive protections normally associated with first
amendment practices such as bookselling. It has now become easier for gov-
erning officials to demonstrate that state interests promoted by a regulation
far outweigh any incidental effects the regulation may have on protected
forms of expression. As a result, the states are free to adopt a more vigorous
use of their police powers, especially as it relates to borderline areas of pro-
tected expression like adult bookstores and moviehouses.
Andrew E. Forshay
169. Id. at 3180 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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